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The Multi-Center Dilemma Project is a collaborative research endeavour aimed at
determining the role of dilemmas —a kind of cognitive conflict, detected by using an
adaptation of Kelly’s Repertory Grid Technique— in a variety of clinical conditions.
Implicative dilemmas appear in one third of the non-clinical group (n = 321) and in about
half of the clinical group (n = 286), the latter having a proportion of dilemmas that doubles
that of the non-clinical sample. Within the clinical group, we studied 87 subjects, after
completing a psychotherapy process, and found that therapy helps to dissolve those
dilemmas. We also studied, independently, a group of subjects diagnosed with social
phobia (n = 13) and a group diagnosed with irritable bowel syndrome (n = 13) in
comparison to non-clinical groups. In both health related problems, dilemmas seem to be
quite relevant. Altogether, these studies, though preliminary (and with a small group size
in some cases), yield a promising perspective to the unexplored area of the role of cognitive
conflicts as an issue to consider when trying to understand some clinical conditions, as
well as a focus to be dealt with in psychotherapy when dilemmas are identified.
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El Proyecto Multi-Céntrico Dilema aúna los esfuerzos de distintos centros de investigación
con el propósito de determinar el papel de los dilemas personales en una amplia gama
de problemas de salud. Estos dilemas, identificados mediante una adaptación de la
Técnica de Rejilla de Kelly, aparecen en un tercio de un grupo de población normal (n
= 321) y en la mitad del grupo clínico (n = 286). Comparando los sujetos que presentan
dilemas, los del grupo clínico doblan a los del grupo normal en proporción de dilemas.
También revisamos dos estudios independientes con un grupo de pacientes diagnosticados
con fobia social (n = 13) y otro con síndrome del intestino irritable (n = 13), ambos en
comparación con grupos de población normal. En los dos casos se encuentran diferencias
que apuntan en la dirección de la relevancia de los dilemas. Tomando en conjunto los
datos disponibles, todo parece augurar unas buenas perspectivas con respecto al papel
relevante (auque hasta el momento no explorado) de los conflictos cognitivos a la hora
de comprender algunos problemas clínicos. También sugieren el interés de incluir en su
tratamiento el trabajo con dilemas, al menos para los sujetos que los presenten.
Palabras clave: conflicto cognitivo, técnica de rejilla, teoría de los constructos personales,
fobia social, síndrome del intestino irritable
The Multi-Center Dilemma Project:
An Investigation on the Role of Cognitive Conflicts in Health
Guillem Feixas1 and Luis Ángel Saúl2
1University of Barcelona
2Open University (UNED)
The Spanish Journal of Psychology Copyright 2004 by The Spanish Journal of Psychology
2004, Vol. 7, No. 1, 69-78 1138-7416
This work was partially supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain Research grant BSO2000-0661. We are also
grateful to the Departament de Personalitat, Avaluació i Tractament Psicològics at the Universitat de Barcelona for  their support.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Guillem Feixas, Departament de Personalitat, Avaluació i Tractament
Psicològics. Universitat de Barcelona. Passeig vall d´Hebron, 171. 08035 Barcelona (Spain). Fax: 00 34 934 021 362. E-Mail: gfeixas@ub.edu
69
The Multi-Center Dilemma Project (MDP) was launched
as a research project in 1999 to investigate the role of
dilemmas in different mental and physical health problems,
and to devise and implement therapeutic methods focused on
resolving those dilemmas (see more details in Feixas, Saúl,
Ávila-Espada, & Sánchez, 2001; Feixas, Saul, & Sánchez,
2000; and on the Internet: www.usal.es/tcp). Currently, various
Universities and clinical centers, mainly from Spain but also
from the United Kingdom, Portugal, Italy and South America,
are involved, at different levels, in this project. 
Despite their relevance in many problems involving
decision making, the notions of cognitive conflicts and
dilemmas are scarcely investigated. Psychoanalytical theories
use the notion of conflict to refer to the internal dynamics
of the psyche. Piaget (e.g., 1975) uses the term “cognitive
conflict” to refer to the contradictions the child encounters
when trying to explain events. These conflicts cause
disequilibrium, and the child is forced to reorganize his
intellectual processes in order to rid him or herself of the
conflict which is causing the trouble; hence the consequent
intellectual change. Also, social cognitive theorists such as
Heider (1946) and Festinger (1957), with their theories of
balance and cognitive dissonance respectively, dealt with the
issue of lack of internal consistency. These theories postulated
a tendency to avoid contradictory cognitions about social
reality. However, the tension arising from imbalanced,
incongruent or dissonant beliefs is conceived as a motivational
force in human behavior. Cognitive balance or congruity has
been shown to be related to a variety of social decision
making theories. Thus, although these dissonances or conflicts
are recognized to be unpleasant experiences, they have not
been related to unhealthy states or psychopathology. On the
contrary, cognitive conflicts are seen as a central aspect of
human motivation and growth (Feixas, 2002). 
One of the major problems of these theories about
cognitive conflicts is finding a way to define them in
operational terms. That is, certainly, a crucial issue for the
development of research programs to investigate the nature
and influence of cognitive conflicts on human behavior.
In sum, it can be argued that the notion of cognitive
conflict is central to human functioning, as recognized by
various psychological theories, even though the internal nature
of conflict makes it difficult to identify and measure. For the
most part, the notion of cognitive conflict must be formulated
in the context of a wider psychological theory capable of
providing more specific terms and instruments to assess it.
Our research program, the MDP, is based on Kelly’s
(1955, 2001) Personal Construct Psychology (PCP), a
constructivist theory that understands human functioning as
based on the meaning we ascribe to events (Botella & Feixas,
1998; Feixas & Villegas, 2000). The interest of a constructivist
orientation in clinical and health psychology lies in its focus
on the subjective meaning people give to themselves, others
and the events they encounter (this includes their problems
as well as interventions provided by professionals). Since the
idea is that people do not react to stimuli, but to the way they
interpret them, methods of conducting a systematic and careful
study of the subject’s interpretations seem clearly relevant
both for research and clinical practice (Feixas, 2003). In effect,
the interventions devised for a particular situation will also
have to be elaborated by the very same subject. That is,
patients (or consultants) will react to them depending on how
they assimilate the interventions within their construction
system (i.e., complying/agreeing with them or resisting them,
see Feixas, Sánchez, Laso, & Gómez-Jarabo, 2002).
Similar to other constructivist theories, in PCP the
individual is seen as continuously interpreting events in terms
of his or her cognitive system, and revising it as a scientist
would do. This system is formed by a set of bi-polar personal
constructs with multiple inter-relationships. The cognitive
conflicts, in this context, are identified as particular construct
arrangements that lead to contradicting actions or dispositions. 
We have devised a method to identify those conflicts
using the Repertory Grid Technique (RGT). As summarized
in Appendixes 1 and 2, the RGT is one of the more
commonly used instruments for investigating an individual’s
personal construction system (it can be used in families and
groups as well). Our interest is to explore the role of these
conflicts in various clinical or health related conditions. We
have completed some preliminary studies in the areas of
social phobia (Díaz, Feixas, Pellungrini, & Saúl, 2001),
irritable bowel syndrome (Benasayag, Feixas, & Mearín,
2002; Benasayag, Feixas, Mearin, Saúl, & Laso, 2004), and
menopause (Lucero, Feixas, & Saúl, 2003). We are also
collecting data in the areas of depression and agoraphobia.
Personal Constructs, Cognitive Conflicts, 
and Symptoms
As it is central to constructivist approaches (Feixas &
Villegas, 2000), PCP views human activity as a meaning
creating process (for an extensive account of PCP, see Botella
& Feixas, 1998; Kelly, 1955, 2001). How human organisms
behave is dependant on the way they construe events and
in turn, assign meaning to those events. 
For Kelly, humans are scientists who construct theories
about themselves and the world. While formal theories are
made out of theoretical constructs, each person, creates his
or her own system of personal constructs to interpret and
anticipate events.
Personal constructs are distinctions drawn from experience
and thus incorporated into the construction system to anticipate
future events. Each construct entails a difference, and can be
represented as a bi-polar dimension of meaning, such as
“beautiful-ugly”. Many distinctions, however, are pre-verbal
and remain without a label in the personal construction system.
Constructs are not isolated units but are connected with others
by implication lines, thus forming a complex system of
meanings. For example, for a given subject the construct
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“extraverted-introverted”1 may be linked to the construct
“competent-incompetent”, so that being extraverted implies
being competent as well. However, for another subject,
extraverted may not imply competence but mainly “being the
protagonist” versus “remaining unnoticed” in the group.
The personal construction system is organized as a
hierarchical network of constructs. Some of these constructs
are very concrete and serve as kind of operational definitions
of higher order constructs. For example, “being able to talk
to an audience-unable to talk in public” might be, for a
given subject, an operational definition of the super-ordinate
construct “secure-insecure”. Some of these high order
constructs form the core of the system, that is, his or her
personal sense of identity. Changing those constructs will
be resisted because it would imply alterations in the whole
system, and a threat to the personal identity of the subject.
Since personal construction systems are idiosyncratic,
both in their content and structure (implication lines among
constructs,), PCP has devised methods for studying them
for each individual. Understanding an individual’s
construction system is necessary to predict which changes
can be made and which might be resisted. Changes in the
system involving a change in the sense of identity will
inevitably take more time. Other constructs have to be
incorporated within the system as well.
Symptoms (anxiety, depression, fear, avoidant behaviors,
etc.) are a painful, but integral part of human activity. They
challenge many theoretical and everyday concepts regarding
human behavior. From a PCP perspective, however, they
are not an exception to the laws of behavior, or an error of
nature, but activities embedded in an interpretation process.
When the constructs are invalidated during the flow of
experience, emotions may appear until the subject has revised
his or her personal construction system.
PCP has elaborated several hypotheses for understanding
symptoms as related to the construal process. For example,
Fransella (1970), in her study with individuals who stutter,
suggested that symptoms could end up being a way of life
for the client by becoming a central structure in his/her
construction system or identity. In this situation, abandoning
the symptoms would involve abandoning a core meaning
structure which could be essential for making sense of
oneself and the world. Lack of predictability within the
construction system would be experienced as anxiety by the
person. According to Kelly (1955), “even an obviously
invalid part of a construction system may be preferable to
the void of anxiety which might be caused by its elimination
altogether” (p. 831). 
Another hypothesis derived from PCP regarding
understanding symptoms as related to meaning, focuses on
the idea of conflict. We can differentiate two types of cognitive
conflicts: implicative dilemmas and dilemmatic constructs.
Implicative Dilemmas
For some clients, symptom loss, while desirable, may
carry negative implications. That is, construing the self with
a symptomatic pole of a construct is a way of maintaining
their present position in positive poles of other, more central,
constructs. This is because the symptomatic construct for
which the change is desirable, is linked, through their
construction system, to other constructs for which change is
not desirable and would involve considerable threat. For
example, Winter (1988, 1989) studied clients with social
anxiety problems for whom social competence carried
negative implications, and the more pronounced these
implications, the more negative the outcome in social skills
training groups. He suggests that improvement or symptom
reduction may confront these clients with guilt (Winter, 1989),
which Kelly described as the experience of dislodgement
from one’s core role (our way of relating to others). 
We have described (Feixas, Saúl, Avila-Espada, & Sánchez,
2001; Feixas, Saul, & Sánchez, 2000; Feixas & Saúl, 2002)
a way of identifying implicative dilemmas from the RGT
which has been implemented in the RECORD/GRIDCOR (see
footnote 5 in Appendix 2) program version 4.0 (Feixas &
Cornejo, 2002). In this way, two different types of constructs
are differentiated; discrepant and congruent. The former type
refers to those constructs from which the subject rates the self
now and the ideal self at different ends of the construct poles.
For example, on a 7-point Likert scale, the difference would
have to be greater than 3 points to meet the criteria for a
discrepant construct. A difference of less than 2 would be
considered as a congruent construct, i.e. the subject rates the
self now and ideal self elements similarly. 
Discrepant constructs (e.g., timid vs. sociable) indicate
areas of dissatisfaction for the individual, areas in which the
subject would like to experience substantial change. Often,
they represent symptomatic aspects of the person. Conversely,
congruent constructs (e.g., modest vs. arrogant) reveal areas
of satisfaction for the subject. They refer to personal qualities
(i.e., modesty) that are not felt to require change, in fact, the
subject may even be proud of them. The dilemma appears
when the desired change in a discrepant construct (becoming
sociable) implies an undesired change (i.e., becoming arrogant)
in a congruent construct (as measured by a correlation between
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1 Note that here “extraverted-introverted” is a personal construct, not a theoretical construct. While the latter is defined within the
context of a given personality theory (e.g. Eysenck’s), when considered as a personal construct it has to be interpreted according to the
meaning the particular subject in case gives to the term. That personal meaning can be best understood by exploring the implication
lines that the construct “extraverted-introverted” has with the other constructs of his or her personal construction system.
these two constructs, set up at the minimum level of 0.20,
for clinical practice, or at the level of 0.35 in our research
studies). In PCP, the term implicative dilemmas is used to
refer to this type of conflict because the dilemma is caused
by the implication lines among constructs, that is, the way
constructs are linked in the construction system (see Figure
2 for a graphic disposition). In the example above, “sociable”
implies “arrogant” and “timid” implies “modest.”
To offer a case illustration, we analyzed Teresa’s grid (see
Appendix 1 and Figure 1) and we identified two implicative
dilemmas related to her depressive symptoms (see Figure 3).
The patient associates the construct pole “does not get
depressed easily” with two construct poles that she considers
opposite her self-definition: 
To be “selfish” (vs. being concerned about others).
To be the kind of person that “pretends to be stronger
than one is” (vs. being natural). 
The aim of therapy (as described in Feixas & Saúl, in
press) was to sever these associations, as at present, they
were preventing the client from forming alternative definitions
of her self, i.e. as a person who does not get depressed easily.
As a consequence of implicative dilemma resolution, the
client would be alleviated of her depressive symptoms.
According to our therapeutic hypothesis, we should help
the patient to elaborate, in alternative ways, the implications
of her constructs and to facilitate a wider perspective in
which to view herself. Loosening the implications of her
constructs would help Teresa to see herself as a person who
is natural, concerned about others, (the opposite of a “selfish”
person and one who pretends “to be stronger than one is”)
while at the same time “does not get depressed easily.”
Figure 2. Basic structure of an implicative dilemma derived from
repertory grid data.
The period of time between the first and the last grid was
only four months. Therapy had to end just before the academic
holidays, so we didn’t have much time to work. However,
the patient began to show signs of elaboration (expansion)
of some of her constructs. She started to appreciate that
“concern about others” also implies concern about oneself.
Thus, the construct became more permeable so as to include
the self among the range of its elements. Probably, as a
consequence of this reconstruction, the client’s psychological
well being was enhanced, and therefore her depression
reduced, as denoted by the assessment at the end of therapy.
The improvements at the symptomatic level were
accompanied by changes in Teresa’s construing. The
correlations between the constructs involved in the two
implicative dilemmas described before, decreased to 0.22
and 0.16 respectively, indicating a change in the direction
of dilemma resolution or dissolution.
Dilemmatic Constructs
A dilemmatic construct is one which does not offer a clear
course of action. Constructs are bi-polar meaning structures,
and, according to Kelly’s (1955, 2001) choice corollary, the
person chooses for him or herself the pole of the construct
that permits greater elaboration of the system, that is, the one
which increases its predictive power (or, at least, decreases
the unpredictability of events). For some constructs, both poles
are considered as undesirable by the subject, or he or she may
be ambivalent, as each pole has both advantages and
disadvantages. The person, therefore, may not be able to choose
between the alternatives represented by either construct pole.
In the context of the RGT, we identify a dilemmatic
construct by a middle-point score on the ideal self element.
That is, the person does not wish to be either of the two poles
of the construct. For example, in the construct “talkative-
reserved” the person rates a 4 for his or her ideal self. This
score means that he or she does not wish to be talkative or
reserved. Both of the options may involve advantages and
disadvantages. Being talkative might be useful in facilitating
the ease of social interactions but it may also carry the
implication of being superficial or boring. The person may
not perceive either of the two alternatives as desirable and
may therefore remain in the middle-point of the scale.
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Figure 3. Implicative dilemmas identified in Teresa’s initial grid.
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If many dilemmatic constructs appear in a subject’s grid,
it means we can hypothesize that he or she has not
developed meaningful constructions which are viable or
useful to him or her. This condition may manifest itself in
feelings of insecurity, hesitation or lack of action. The person
may not know in which direction to go, rather he or she
may know where to avoid going, and may consequently
adopt a potentially uncertain or reluctant attitude towards
actions involved with those constructs.
Some Preliminary Research Data
What follows is a review of some of the studies which
have recently been conducted. The different research centers
participating in the MDP provide a central database with
data regarding their subjects, then these data are used for
different studies. As these are ongoing projects, the studies
themselves need more refinements, (which we are in the
process of doing), and more areas are presently being studied,
but no results or publications have been produced yet.
Descriptive Data Comparing Clinical and 
Non-Clinical Groups 
Our first data report (Feixas & Saul, 2003) on the general
status of the MDP database shows that implicative dilemmas
can be identified in the grids of one third (34%) of a non
clinical group of 321 subjects recruited by psychology
students after some training in grid administration and
analysis. In a clinical group of 286 psychotherapy clients
presenting with a wide variety of clinical problems (excluding
psychosis or problems involving severe brain damage or
disability), dilemmas appear in more than one half (52.4%)
of the group. This difference proved to be significant using
a chi-squared test. 
To further investigate the number of dilemmas appearing
in each group (among those subjects who presented at least
one), we used the Percentage of Implicative Dilemmas (PID)
measure2. The clinical group (4.37%) had double the number
of dilemmas than the non-clinical group (2.11%), a significant
difference. 
Despite the differences found with respect to implicative
dilemmas, no noticeable differences were found with respect
to dilemmatic constructs.
In sum, these exploratory results indicate that:
a) The presence of dilemmas, as shown by repertory
grids, is a common and natural situation in humans, at least
to some degree.
b) Subjects in consultation for clinical problems are more
likely to present dilemmas than subjects who aren’t.
c) Grids of subjects presenting with psychological
symptoms yield a greater number of dilemmas.
Points (b) and (c) suggest that dilemmas are related to
psychological distress, but point (a) cautions us against
considering dilemmas as a pathological sign. Altogether,
our research seems to suggest that dilemmas are a part of
life but, when not addressed, or when excessive in number
(and maybe in intensity), they can be associated with
suffering and pathology. This can be seen as an argument
in favor of the idea that there is not a distinct line
distinguishing between “normal” and “pathological” subjects.
Maybe we, as humans, develop symptoms when, among
many other reasons, the dilemmas we face are excessive,
or we feel that we are “in over our heads” (Kegan, 1994).
Some Data on Social Phobia
As mentioned before, the area of social anxiety was one
of the first areas to be investigated with respect to the presence
of dilemmas. However, no systematic and well defined criteria
to identify dilemmas had been used before. We conducted a
study (Díaz et al., 2001) with a small number (n = 13, 9 male,
4 female) of participants who had been diagnosed with social
phobia, and compared them to a non-clinical group of 224
subjects in terms of their cognitive conflicts. 
Results of the comparison can be found in Table 1. Three
levels of conflict were established. The grids for subjects in
the “no conflict” level (8% of the clinical and 20% of the
non-clinical groups) did not yield either implicative dilemmas
or dilemmatic constructs. The grids in the “moderate conflict”
level show either implicative dilemmas (23% clinical, 17%
non-clinical) or dilemmatic constructs (23% clinical, 43%
non-clinical). Those with both types of conflicts (46% of the
2 Although the number of dilemmas in a given grid would seem an obvious measure, we have found, in a pilot study, that the amount
of dilemmas may increase with grid size. Therefore, as grid size is not standardized, grids cannot be reliably compared.
dPID = ————————— x 100(n!2·[(n – 2)!])
d = number of dilemmas
n = number of constructs in the grid
PID = Percentage of Implicative Dilemmas
A method was devised to compensate for this problem which takes into account the number of constructs in the grid. The number
of possible pairs of constructs was calculated and used as the denominator in the formula. The result of this equation is multiplied by
100, in order to establish the percentage (PID). 
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clinical group vs. 20% of the non-clinical group) were
considered “high conflict”. Looking at the clinical group,
only 8% (one subject) could be placed at the “no conflict”
level while 46% were classified within the “high conflict”
category. Overall, implicative dilemmas help to discriminate
better between clinical (69%) and non-clinical groups (37%)
than dilemmatic constructs. When looking at the number of
implicative dilemmas, the average for those presenting with
this type of conflict was much higher for the clinical group
(9.92; SD = 14.9) than for the non-clinical group (1.65; SD
= 3.4). Although no statistical significance was computed
for these data because of the small size of the data, some
trends seem clearly promising, making future investigations
with bigger groups a worthy investment.
Our descriptive study suggests that cognitive conflicts,
although by no means considered to be causal or constitutive,
may play an important role in social anxiety problems, at
least, for some subjects. Thus, cognitive conflicts may or
may not, play a role in subjects diagnosed with social phobia,
however, it does seem likely. Also, for those whose conflicts
can be identified in their grids, the degree of relevance of
the conflicts might be different. Consequently, it seems
reasonable to recommend the assessment of conflicts in
order to identify those subjects for whom conflicts play a
role in the problem. For these subjects, therapy should be
directed at dealing with these conflicts and eventually
resolving or dissolving them. Therapeutic procedures which
address this aim have already been developed (Feixas, Saúl,
Ávila, & Sánchez, 2001; Feixas & Saúl, in press). 
Some Data on Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS) 
There have been no previous studies on the content or
structure of personal constructs in subjects with this
diagnosis. IBS is a functional digestive disorder with multiple
manifestations (e.g., abdominal pain and discomfort) for
which no organic cause is found. To date, research shows
that these subjects tend to have more psychological distress
than other medical subjects: They present a high degree of
comorbidity with psychiatric diagnosis, higher values in
neuroticism and psychoticism, higher levels of stressful
events, and a greater frequency of having experienced some
kind of abuse (see Amigó, Fernández, & Pérez, 1998;
Benasayag, Feixas, & Mearin, 2002; Fernández, 2003).
Our study (Benasayag, Feixas, Mearin, Saúl, & Laso,
2004) compared a non-clinical group (63 subjects, with no
psychiatric or digestive diagnosis known) with a small group
(n = 13; 12 female, 1 male) of subjects diagnosed with IBS.
Twelve out of thirteen IBS subjects also complied with the
criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis using DSM-IV (Axis I);
7 with a diagnosis within the anxiety group, and 5 within
the somatization disorders group.
The results, as summarized in Table 2, suggest that
subjects with IBS present with many more implicative
dilemmas and dilemmatic constructs than those in the normal
group. Among IBS subjects, those with a diagnosis of
somatization were the ones with a higher number of conflicts.
Although no statistical analysis could be reasonably carried
out because of the small number of cases, the magnitude of
the differences clearly encourages more research with more
cases, something we are presently working on.
With respect to the other grid measurements, we can
appreciate the impressive differences shown in Table 2 (again,
they need to be replicated with a bigger group and tested for
statistical significance). The mean of the non-clinical group
for the self-esteem measurement is almost identical to that
of subjects with IBS diagnosed together with somatization
disorders, but quite higher with respect to those diagnosed
with anxiety disorders. Subjects diagnosed with both IBS
and somatization show lower levels of differentiation (higher
PVAFF scores [Percentage of Variance Accounted for by the
First Factor]) and higher levels of polarization (extremity of
ratings) than non-clinical subjects and also, more markedly,
than those diagnosed with anxiety disorders.
These results suggest that subjects with IBS present with
more conflicts in their construction system than a non-clinical
Table 1
Presence of Implicative Dilemmas and Dilemmatic Constructs in a Clinical Group of Patients Diagnosed with Social Phobia
(n = 13) and a Non-Clinical (N = 224) Group (Díaz et al., 2001)
Presence of Implicative Dilemmas
Presence of Dilemmatic Constructs 
No ID With ID Total 
No DC NO CONFLICT MODERATE CONFLICT
8%  Clinical 23% Clinical 31% Clinical 
20% Non-clinical 17% Non-clinical 37% Non-clinical 
With DC MODERATE CONFLICT HIGH CONFLICT
23% Clinical 46% Clinical 69% Clinical 
43% Non-clinical 20% Non-clinical 63% Non-clinical 
Total 31% Clinical 69%  Clinical 
63% Non-clinical 37% Non-clinical
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group. Even comparing them to the clinical group mentioned
before, they seemed to be particularly prone to those conflicts
(especially those diagnosed with somatization). 
The Therapy Process and its Influence in Resolving
Dilemmas: Some Descriptive Data 
Feixas and Saul’s (2003) preliminary report mentions
another study with 87 clinical patients, including a re-analysis
of 46 neurotic clients who were part of the sample used by
Watson (1998). We examined the presence or absence of
implicative dilemmas before and after therapy. From the data,
it can be observed that subjects who do not present with
implicative dilemmas at the start of therapy are unlikely to
exhibit them when therapy ends; only 7.9% of the patients
who did not exhibit implicative dilemmas at the start of
therapy did so at the end. More than two thirds (69.4%) of
the group who presented with implicative dilemmas at the
start of therapy did not present with implicative dilemmas at
the end. Finally, less than one third (30.6%) of subjects who
presented with implicative dilemmas at the start of therapy,
presented with implicative dilemmas at the end. These data
suggest that psychological therapy, even when it is not
specifically addressed towards resolving previously identified
dilemmas, produces a statistically significant reduction in the
number of implicative dilemmas in patients (p < 0.001, using
a chi-squared test reported in Feixas & Saul, 2003).
Overall, we found that the percentage of patients who
present with implicative dilemmas after the therapeutic
process is 20.7%. In comparison with the 34% found in the
non-clinical group mentioned above, this is a lower profile
of dilemmas for clients who completed a psychotherapy
process. These data suggest that therapy decreases the
number of implicative dilemmas to a level below that of
the general population. So, psychotherapy does not merely
return subjects to a normal level of conflict within their
construction system, but actually serves to enhance or
facilitate their construing to a more resolved level and helps
them to be more dilemma free than average.
Obviously, more research is needed for exploring
differences among psychotherapy approaches and their
influence on decreasing the number of dilemmas one
experiences. More importantly, research is needed to assess
whether a brief therapy protocol focused on resolving
previously identified dilemmas produces good outcomes, both
in terms of symptom reduction and the dilemma’s resolution.
Conclusions
Conceptualizing human problems in terms of cognitive
conflicts or personal dilemmas is a way of understanding
them from a constructivist perspective. Thus, by employing
the symptom pole, the subject is validating other core
constructs about his or her identity which are associated
with it. Change to the opposite pole, the desired pole, would
also imply abandoning part of his or her identity, which
would involve a central change in the construction system
of the client. 
Implicative dilemmas can be identified using the
Repertory Grid Technique, and each subject’s grid assessed
in terms of their presence (or not), as well as the proportion
of dilemmas found. The results obtained, so far, from the
Multi-Center Dilemma Project indicate that one third of a
non-clinical group presents with implicative dilemmas, which
suggests that dilemmas (even those detected using repertory
grids) are part of the stress of “normal” life. However, they
are more common (and more numerous) for subjects asking
for help in psychotherapy services. This was especially
evident for two clinical conditions investigated: social phobia
and IBS. Further data with therapy clients show that
psychological therapy, even when it is not specifically
addressed towards resolving previously identified dilemmas,
produces a statistically significant reduction in the number
of implicative dilemmas the patient experiences. 
These results suggest that more attention should be paid
to implicative dilemmas, both as a personality characteristic,
and in the therapy process. The presence of cognitive
conflicts cuts across many clinical conditions and diagnostic
categories. As far as we know, it cannot be considered the
cause nor the consequence of any of them. But when
conflicts are detected, our studies suggest that it would be
convenient to address them in the therapy process. And so,
clearly, a systematic assessment for exploring cognitive
conflicts seems to be a reasonable recommendation for
clinical research and practice.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of a IBS and a Non-Clinical Groups on a Selection of Grid Measures
(Benasayag, Feixas, Mearin, Saúl, & Laso, 2004)
Non-clinical n = 63 SII n = 13 Somatization n = 7 Anxiety n = 5
Number of implicative dilemmas 3.22 (5.21) 12.62 (14.74) 17.57 (16.50) 8.20 (11.67) 
Number of dilemmatic constructs 1.95 (2.38) 3.77 (3.60) 5.71 (3.86) 1.60 (1.52) 
Self-esteem (self-ideal correlation) 0.42 (0.33) 0.31 (0.38) 0.40 (0.24) 0.11 (0.52)
Differentiation (PVAFF) 42.30 (11.06) 44.60 (14.05) 48.78 (16.69) 39.28 (10.31) 
Polarization 23.47 (13.88) 28.83 (20.04) 35.87 (18.38) 19.86 (22.49)
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A Summary Description of the Repertory Grid Technique
as Used to Investigate Interpersonal Construing
Background
Kelly (1955) created the Role Construct Repertory Test,
or Reptest, and also its grid form, within the context of his
Personal Construct Theory. Since then, it has evolved as
complex and flexible methodology known as the Repertory
Grid Technique (RGT)1 with a variety of formats and
applications. The RGT is devised to assess the dimensions
and structure of personal meaning, usually in the subject’s
own terms. Thus, it aims at grasping the way an individual
(also groups and institutions) makes sense of him or herself
and others. The RGT explores the structure and content of
the construction systems, implicit theories or meaning
structures with which people construct their experience,
perceive and act. 
Administration Procedure
The administration of the RGT designed to study
interpersonal construing in individuals involves three stages
(Feixas & Cornejo, 1996) in the context of a structured
interview. This process will be illustrated in the case of
Teresa2.
Apendix 1
Se
lf 
no
w
M
ot
he
r 
Fa
th
er
B
ro
th
er
B
oy
fri
en
d
Fr
ie
nd
 1
Fr
ie
nd
 2
N
on
-g
ra
ta
Fr
ie
nd
 3
Co
us
in
G
od
m
ot
he
r
Fr
ie
nd
 4
 
Id
ea
l S
el
f 
CONSTRUCTS
ELEMENTS
1 There are several manuals for this technique, see for example, Feixas and Cornejo, 1996; Fransella, Bell and Bannister, 2004; Rivas
and Marco, 1985.
2 When Teresa, 22 years old, was seen by the second author (LAS) at the psychological services of the University of Salamanca, she
was in the final year of her studies in chemical sciences. Although Teresa proves to be an excellent student, she reveals serious doubts
about her self worth. She cries frequently, and has great difficulty in meeting others, even though she has a boyfriend who is extremely
supportive. Teresa is anxiously hesitant about accepting a new job which would involve moving to another city 600 Km away from home.
1. Pessimistic 1. Optimistic 1 1 5 2 7 3 6 2 6 4 3 2 7
2. Self-demanding 2. Takes it easy 1 6 6 2 2 5 6 3 5 6 4 5 4
3. Fearful 3. Enterprising 2 2 6 2 4 5 6 5 2 3 4 5 5
4. Lives to work 4. Works to live 5 1 2 2 6 6 6 1 6 7 6 6 7 
5. Imposes his/her wishes 5. Tolerant with others 6 2 1 1 4 3 6 1 7 3 4 2 7 
6. Teasing 6. Touchy 2 7 1 6 4 3 4 6 3 3 5 6 3 
7. Appreciates others 7. Does not appreciate others 2 6 6 6 1 5 4 7 4 2 2 5 1 
8. Aggressive 8. Calm 6 4 2 2 7 4 6 2 6 6 6 3 7 
9. Concerned about others 9. Selfish 2 2 6 7 2 3 5 7 3 3 2 2 2 
10. Avaricious 10. Generous 6 1 1 1 7 5 5 1 6 3 3 6 7 
11. Sensitive 11. Materialistic, superficial 1 5 7 7 1 4 5 7 1 4 3 4 1 
12. Cheeky 12. Respectful 6 6 5 4 6 6 6 1 6 5 6 5 7 
13. Hypocritical 13. Sincere 5 4 4 2 6 5 5 1 6 6 5 4 7 
14. Blackmailer 14. Non blackmailer 3 2 2 1 5 6 6 1 6 6 6 3 7 
15. Appears stronger than is 15. Natural 6 3 1 2 5 2 4 2 7 6 6 5 6 
16. Does not look after the friendship 16. Looks after the friendship 6 3 3 3 6 2 1 2 4 4 6 4 7 
17. Non Accessible 17. Accessible 5 2 2 1 4 2 4 1 6 3 5 2 7
18. Introverted 18. Extroverted 1 2 6 2 4 5 7 5 2 6 6 5 5 
19. Gets depressed easily 19. Does not get depressed easily 1 2 6 3 6 3 7 6 1 3 3 3 6 
20. Tries to find the good in things 20. Sees only the negative 6 6 4 6 1 5 2 7 6 3 3 5 1 
1 very much so, 2 quite a lot, 3 a little, 4 middle point, 5 a little, 6 quite a lot, 7 very much so.
Figure 1. Teresa’s pre-therapy Repertory Grid. 
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Selection of elements. Normally, a set of 10-20 elements
must be selected from the subject’s world. Often, these
elements represent various “role titles” of significant others
(heading columns in the example shown in Figure 1) who
play a part in the person’s life (e.g., family members,
employer, friends, a disliked figure) including his or her
present self and the ideal self (“how I would like to be”). 
Construct elicitation. The individual is asked to
concentrate on pre-selected groupings of two or three
elements and to construe them in terms of their similarities
and/or contrasts which requires the subject to provide the
meaning dimensions that make these elements similar or
different. In the example, Teresa is asked in which ways her
parents are similar, to which she replies they “take it easy.”
Then, she is asked what would be the opposite of taking it
easy, and she replies “self-demanding.” Thus, the first
construct is elicited and written in the rows of the grid table
(as in Figure 1). With the same dyad of elements (father and
mother), she is asked for more similarities and, then, for
differences between them, to which she replies her mother
is “pessimistic” while her father is more “optimistic,” this
being another construct to be added to the list. She is asked
for more differences (or similarities) until she cannot come
up with any others. Then, a new dyad of elements is selected
(e.g., self now and mother) and the process is repeated until
all elements appear at least once in the comparisons. There
is a limit on the number of constructs to be elicited. The
construct elicitation process ends whenever interviewer and
subject consensually feel no more new constructs can appear
(what is known as the “saturation point”).
Rating the elements in terms of the constructs. The grid
form implies that each construct (row) is applied to each
element (column), usually employing a rating system (7-
point Likert-type scale). Thus, by applying (rating) all the
constructs across the entire set of elements, a grid data matrix
is created (see Figure 1). 
Analysis and interpretation
The grid data matrix can be analyzed in a variety of ways
ranging from qualitative appreciation of the nature and quality
of the constructs used, to the statistical analysis of the data
using cluster analysis or factor analytic methods. Finally, a
number of cognitive measures can be extracted (e.g.,
differentiation, cognitive complexity, self-esteem, conflict
analysis, extremity of ratings3) which can serve both to generate
clinical hypotheses and to look for individual differences. A
selection of these measures can be found in Appendix 2.
A Selection of Measures Derived from Repertory Grids
Using the RECORD/GRIDCOR4 Program Version 4.0 
The Percentage of Variance Accounted for by the First
Factor (PVAFF) is a factor analytic measure based on
correspondence analysis. We consider it to be the best
measure of cognitive complexity. 
Bannister’s (1962) Intensity is calculated from the
sum of the squared values of the correlations of each
construct with the rest of the constructs, averaged by the
total number of constructs minus one. This process is
repeated with each element, and the overall Intensity is
calculated by averaging the intensity scores of constructs
and elements. 
Polarization is scored as the percentage of extreme
ratings (e.g., 1 or 7 in a 7-point scale) in the grid matrix.
The use of extreme ratings in grids with elicited constructs
might reflect the subjective meaningfulness of specific
constructs and elements. When taken as an overall measure
(averaging extremity for the whole grid), it may indicate
the degree of rigidity or pathology of the system (Neimeyer
& Feixas, 1992).
Self-Ideal differentiation is computed using the elements
“self now” and “ideal self” product-moment correlation. It
can be considered as a measure of self-esteem. 
Self-Others Differentiation is calculated by computing the
correlation between the “self now” and an artificial “others”
element which is the result of averaging the scores of all but
the “self now” and the “ideal self” elements. Low scores of
self-others differentiation have been labeled «identification»
by some authors and we consider that high scores can be
considered an indication of “perceived social isolation.”
Ideal-Others Differentiation. Although less frequently
used in psychological literature, we consider the correlation
between the “ideal self” and the “others” elements to be a
measure of perceived adequacy of others. For example, while
a high negative correlation can indicate that the subject is
dissatisfied with the people that surround him/her, a positive
correlation suggests a perception along the lines of «everyone
is great.» 
3 We have conducted various methodological studies about the validity and reliability of these measures (Feixas, Bach & Laso, in
press; Feixas, López-Moliner, Navarro-Montes, Tudela-Marí, & Neimeyer, 1992) 
4 RECORD is the Spanish name of the program for which a Manual was published, in Spanish, for version 2.0 (Feixas & Cornejo,
1996). GRIDCOR is the name of the English version of this program. Version 4.0 of both programs and operative instructions for its
use can be found on the Internet: www.terapiacognitiva.net/record
Appendix 2
